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1 Introduction
Load Balancing games constitute an important class of strategic games that cap-
ture many applications of practical relevance. These games model situations in
which a set of strategically acting players (or jobs) compete for a limited number
of resources (or machines). Every player chooses one of the resources available to
him and assigns his weight (or load) to this resource. The latency of a resource
depends on the total weight of the players using it. The goal of each player is
to select a resource such that the latency that he experiences on this resource is
minimized.
The study of Load Balancing games is motivated by the need for quantifying
the inefficiency caused by the selfish behavior of a set of autonomous players
that utilize distributed processors upon which a system is built. The social cost
objective of an assignment of loads to processors is measured by the makespan,
i.e., the completion time of the most loaded machine, which reflects the distance
from equi-distribution (balancing) of the load to the machines. Load Balancing
games have recently been studied extensively for a variety of different machine
environments, including identical [20], uniformly related [11,15,19,20], restricted
assignment [5,15], and unrelated machines [2].
A natural generalization of Load Balancing games are Bottleneck Congestion
games (BCGs) [6,17]. Here, every player chooses a subset of the resources (also
referred to as facilities in this context) from a set of feasible facility allocations
and assigns his weight to each of these facilities. The goal of each player is to
select a subset of the facilities such that the maximum latency that he experiences
over the chosen facilities is minimized. Load Balancing games constitute a special
case of BCGs in that the strategy space of each player contains only singleton
subsets of facilities (machines), i.e., the strategy of each player is always a single
facility. Another interesting special case of BCGs are Bottleneck Network Routing
games [6]. In these games, the facilities are identified with the links of an underlying
network and the players’ strategies correspond to paths in the network. Despite
their importance, BCGs have received relatively little attention in the literature
and are far from being well-understood. In this paper we study the inefficiency of
stable outcomes in these games.
Bottleneck Congestion games essentially generalize the context of Load Bal-
ancing games by modeling the activity of each selfish player upon complexes of
interrelated resources. This generalization brings the model closer to reality be-
cause in most large scale computing systems, the workload of a player occupies
different components of the system simultaneously. For example, instantiations of
such games emerge if the components form paths in networks, or if they corre-
spond to interconnected parallel processors, etc. It is natural to assume that each
player wants to balance his load across the different components available to him
and, hence, attempts to minimize the maximum latency of a facility that he uses.
One of the most prominent solution concepts for the prediction of outcomes of
rational behavior in strategic games is the Nash equilibrium concept. It describes
outcomes that are resilient to unilateral player deviations. Throughout this pa-
per we will focus exclusively on pure strategy deviations. A more general solution
concept is the strong equilibrium concept introduced by Aumann [3]. It describes
outcomes of strategic games that are stable with respect to coordinated pure devi-
ations of player subsets (also referred to as coalitions). More precisely, an outcome
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of a strategic game is a strong equilibrium if no coalition of the players can deviate
such that every member of the coalition strictly benefits. An outcome is said to
be a k-strong equilibrium if this property holds for all coalitions of size at most
k. Strong equilibria thus generalize the pure Nash equilibrium concept (k = 1).
Harks, Klimm and Mo¨hring [17] showed that (under quite loose assumptions)
BCGs always admit strong equilibria.
It is well known that equilibrium outcomes might be inefficient in the sense
that they are suboptimal with respect to some socially desirable objective function.
A natural social cost objective function that has been studied intensively in the
context of Load Balancing games is to minimize the maximum latency of a facility.
We will use it also here for our investigations of the inefficiency of equilibria for
BCGs.
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [20,21,23] has become the standard measure to
assess the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes. It is defined as the worst-case ratio
(over all instances) of the maximum cost of a Nash equilibrium outcome and the
cost of a socially optimal outcome. The strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) and the
k-strong Price of Anarchy (k-SPoA) [2] refer to the natural adaptations of this
measure to strong and k-strong equilibrium outcomes, respectively.
1.1 Our Contributions
We study the inefficiency of both pure Nash equilibria and strong equilibria of
BCGs. In our studies, we focus on BCGs with linear latency functions, where the
latency of each facility is a linear function of the total weight assigned to it. These
games still constitute a rich class of games and generalize, for example, Load
Balancing games with identical or uniformly related machines (with or without
restricted assignments). We provide upper and lower bounds on the (strong) Price
of Anarchy for symmetric and asymmetric linear BCGs (definitions will be given
below). An overview of the main results obtained in this paper is given in Table 1.
Here, n and m refer to the number of players and facilities, respectively.
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. We show that both the PoA and the SPoA of linear BCGs is Θ(m). More
precisely, we show that m ≤ PoA ≤ 2m − 1 and m − 1 ≤ SPoA ≤ m. These
results hold for linear BCGs in general.
For comparison, Gairing et al. [15] proved that m − 1 ≤ PoA ≤ m for the
case of Load Balancing games with uniformly related machines and restricted
assignments (which is a special case of the linear BCGs considered here). Fur-
ther, Banner and Orda in [6] showed that PoA = Θ(m) for network BCGs with
identical latency functions of the form xp (where p is a constant).
2. We also derive bounds for linear BCGs with identical players, i.e., when all
players have the same weight. In general, for asymmetric BCGs, we establish
an upper bound of SPoA = O(
√
n). For symmetric BCGs, i.e., when all players
have the same strategy space, we derive an (exact) bound of SPoA = 2.
Previously, Gairing et al. [15] proved an upper bound PoA = O(log n/ log log n)
for Load Balancing games with uniformly related machines and restricted as-
signments (which is a special case of asymmetric linear BCGs).
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BCG
id. linear latency arb. linear latency (SPoA)
k-SPoA (lower) SPoA id. players arb. players
sym. max{2, dm/(2k)e} 2 2 O(m)
asym. max
{⌊
− 1
2
+
√
2m+ 1
4
⌋
,
⌊
m
k−1
⌋
− 1
}
Θ(
√
m) O(
√
n) Θ(m)
Table 1 Summary of the bounds obtained for the SPoA and the k-SPoA of linear BCGs. The
PoA of linear BCGs is at most 2m− 1 and there is an asymptotically matching lower bound
showing SPoA ≥ m− 1.
3. We also consider linear BCGs with identical facilities, i.e., when the latency
functions of all facilities are the same. For asymmetric BCGs, we show that
SPoA = Θ(
√
m). Further, for symmetric BCGs, we show that SPoA = 2. In
fact, the lower bound of 2 on the SPoA for symmetric BCGs with identical
players mentioned above also holds for identical facilities. We also give elab-
orate lower bounds on the k-SPoA for symmetric and asymmetric BCGs (see
Table 1 for details).
We note that Load Balancing games with identical machines constitute a spe-
cial case of symmetric linear BCGs with identical facilities. For these games,
Andelman, Feldman and Mansour [2] showed a lower bound of 2m/(m + 1)
on the SPoA, which approaches 2 as the number m of machines (which cor-
respond to the facilities) goes to infinity. Our bound is exact and we show
that the worst-case occurs even for a constant number of facilities and players.
In [2] an exact bound of 2 was shown for the SPoA of Load Balancing games
with unrelated machines; in this setting, the weights of the players may vary,
depending on the machine they choose. Thus, the lower bound of 2 in this case
is incomparable to our lower bound.
4. Finally, we also provide asymptotically tight worst-case examples for (directed)
network linear BCGs (definitions will be given below).
1.2 Related Work
One of the earliest works concerning Network BCGs is by Caragiannis et al. [9].
The authors devised polynomial time algorithms for computing pure Nash equi-
libria, on single sink and/or single source networks, with linear latency functions.
They also provided bounds on the PoA of equilibria for such networks. Network
BCGs were also considered by Banner and Orda [6]. The authors showed existence
of pure Nash equilibria and provided an Θ(m) bound on the PoA for identical net-
work links with latency functions of the form xp, where p is some constant. Busch
and Magdon-Ismail [8] studied the PoA of network BCGs with identical players.
Harks et al. [17] introduced general BCGs and showed that strong equilibria are
guaranteed to exist in these games. In [16], the problem of computing pure Nash
equilibria and strong equilibria is addressed. The paper shows several hardness
results and proposes polynomial time algorithms for special cases. In a very recent
work, Busch and Kannan [7] study the PoA of BCGs under the assumption that
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the players have strategy spaces with bounded stretch; here the stretch constitutes
a measure of variation in resource utilization.
As mentioned above, BCGs generalize Load Balancing games, which have been
studied intensively in recent years. Load Balancing games were first studied by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in their seminal work [20], where they introduce
the Price of Anarchy notion. Among other results, they prove for Load Balac-
ing games with m identical machines a lower bound of Ω(logm/ log logm) on
the PoA for mixed Nash equilibria. Czumaj and Vo¨cking [11] and Koutsoupias,
Mavronicolas and Spirakis [19] proved a matching upper bound. For Load Balanc-
ing games with uniformly related machines, Czumaj and Vo¨cking [11] show that
PoA = Θ(logm/ log log logm) for mixed Nash equilibria.
Concerning the PoA of pure Nash equilibria, an upper bound of 2mm+1 for m
identical machines follows from an early approximation analysis of a local search
heuristic for scheduling by Finn and Horowitz [14]. Schuurman and Vredeveld
[25] gave a matching lower bound example. Czumaj and Vo¨cking [11] proved
that the pure PoA for Load Balancing games on uniformly related machines
is Θ(logm/ log logm). Awerbuch et al. [5] showed that the pure PoA of Load
Balancing games with m identical machines and restricted assignments is also
Θ(logm/ log logm). Independently, Gairing et al. [15] obtained the same bounds.
Further, the authors prove that for m uniformly related machines with restricted
assignments, m − 1 ≤ PoA ≤ m. For a detailed coverage of these results we refer
the reader to [26].
Andelman, Feldman and Mansour [2] were the first to study strong equilibria
and k-strong equilibria in the context of Load Balancing games. For the case of m
unrelated machines, they proved that m ≤ SPoA ≤ 2m−1. Later, Fiat et al. [13] im-
proved these bounds and showed that SPoA = m for these games. The authors also
proved that for uniformly related machines the SPoA is Θ(logm/(log logm)2). For
results in the context of more general scheduling games and associated scheduling
policies (called coordination mechanisms), the interested reader is referred to [18]
and the references therein.
Bottleneck Congestion games owe their name to their similarity to congestion
games, which were introduced by Rosenthal [24]. In these games, the latency on
each facility depends on the number of players using it (i.e., players have unit
weights). The goal of each player is to minimize his cost which is defined as the
sum (as opposed to the maximum for BCGs) of the latencies over the facilities
used by the player. Rosenthal [24] proved the existence of pure Nash equilibria
in congestion games, by usage of potential function arguments. Monderer and
Shapley proved in [22] that the class of congestion games coincides isomorphically
with the class of finite potential games. The Price of Anarchy of pure Nash equi-
libria for congestion games was resolved by Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [10]
and, independently, by Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein [4]. It is shown in [10] that
PoA = Θ(
√
n) for asymmetric linear congestion games and the social cost being
the maximum over the players’ costs, and PoA = 52 for (symmetric and asymmet-
ric) linear congestion games and the social cost being the sum of the players’ costs.
Bounds for polynomial latency functions were also derived in [10]. Exact bounds
for polynomial latencies and also for weighted players were developed in [1].
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2 Preliminaries
In a Bottleneck Congestion game, we are given a set N = [n] of n players that want
to utilize non-cooperatively a set E = [m] of m resources, which we also refer to
as facilities.1 Every player i ∈ N has a positive weight (or load) wi > 0 and a
strategy set Σi ⊆ 2E of feasible facility subsets which he can choose from. If player
i chooses facility subset Si ∈ Σi, he allocates his entire weight wi to each facility
e ∈ Si. Let Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn be the set of all possible strategy choices of the
players. A strategy profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Σ specifies for each player i ∈ N a
strategy Si ∈ Σi that he has chosen. We define Ne(S) to be the set of players that
have chosen facility e ∈ E under S, i.e., Ne(S) = {i ∈ N | e ∈ Si}. The total weight
of facility e ∈ E with respect to S is defined as we(S) =
∑
i∈Ne(S) wi.
Every facility e ∈ E is associated with a latency function le : Σ → R+, which
satisfies the following three properties (see also [17]):
1. Non-negativity: le(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ Σ.
2. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: le(S) = le(S
′) for all S, S′ ∈ Σ with
Ne(S) = Ne(S
′).
3. Monotonicity: le(S) ≥ le(S′) for all S, S′ ∈ Σ with Ne(S) ⊇ Ne(S′).
In this paper, we focus on linear latency (thus, also cost) functions; we moti-
vate our choice in Example 1 below. We call a game symmetric if all players have
the same strategy set, i.e., Σi = Σj for all i, j ∈ N ; we call a game asymmetric
otherwise. Under a given a strategy profile S ∈ Σ, every player i ∈ N experiences
an individual cost ci(S) equal to the latency of the facility in Si with the highest
latency, i.e., ci(S) = maxe∈Si le(S). We assume that every player i ∈ N acts strate-
gically and chooses his strategy Si ∈ Σi in order to minimize his own individual
cost ci(S).
Aumann [3] introduced the notion of a strong equilibrium. Here we consider
the refined notion of k-strong equilibrium. We use the standard notation S−i for
(S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn). Similarly, for a subset of players I ⊆ N we use SI and
S−I to refer to the strategy profiles induced by the strategies of players in I and
N \ I, respectively. For every facility e ∈ E and every subset of players I ⊆ N , we
use the notation le(SI) to denote the latency of e under the strategy profile SI ,
induced only by the players in I (i.e., as if all players in N \ I are absent).
Definition 1 A strategy profile S ∈ Σ is a k-strong equilibrium if for every non-
empty player subset I ⊆ N with |I| ≤ k and for every possible joint deviation S′I
of I there is at least one player i ∈ I, whose cost with respect to S′ = (S−I , S′I) is
not stroctly better than with respect to S, i.e., ci(S−I , S′I) ≥ ci(S).
With this definition, a strong equilibrium is a k-strong equilibrium with k = n,
and a pure Nash equilibrium is a k-strong equilibrium with k = 1. Very recently,
Harks, Klimm and Mo¨hring [17] showed that strong equilibria always exist in
BCGs satisfying Properties 1–3 above.
We are interested in characterizing the inefficiency of k-strong equilibria for
(linear latency) BCGs. We assess the efficiency of a strategy profile S by the max-
imum load of a facility under S. That is, the social cost C(S) of a strategy profile
1 We use [k] to refer to the set {1, . . . , k} for some positive integer k.
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S ∈ Σ is defined as the maximum latency over all facilities, which is equivalent to
the maximum cost over all players, i.e., C(S) = maxe∈E le(S) = maxi∈N ci(S). We
will use S∗ to refer to an optimal strategy profile that minimizes C(S) and denote
its cost by γ∗ = C(S∗).
The k-strong Price of Anarchy (k-SPoA) [2,20] refers to the worst-case ratio over
all possible input instances of the maximum cost of a k-strong equilibrium and the
cost γ∗ of the social optimum. We will simply refer to the Price of Anarchy (PoA)
and strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) for the 1-SPoA and the n-SPoA, respectively.
We next give an example showing that the SPoA is unbounded, even for sym-
metric BCGs with arbitrary latency functions on the facilities satisfying Properties
1–3 above.
Example 1 We construct a BCG with n = 2 players and m = 3 facilities, denoted
e1, e2 and e3. Let Σ1 = {{e1}, {e2}} and Σ2 = {{e2}, {e3}}. The latency functions
are defined as follows. Let M  ε > 0.
le1(S) = ε, le3(S) = M, and le2(S) =
{
M if Ne2(S) = {1, 2}
ε otherwise.
The socially optimal strategy profile is S∗ = (S∗1 , S∗2) with S∗1 = {e1} and S∗2 =
{e2}. We have C(S∗) = ε. Consider the strategy profile S = (S1, S2), where S1 =
{e2} and S2 = {e3}. Clearly, C(S) = M . We claim that S is a strong equilibrium.
Indeed, the only alternative strategy for player 1 is {e1}, which will incur him an
individual cost of ε = c1(S). This rules out a unilateral deviation of player 1, but
also a joint deviation along with player 2. The only alternative strategy for player
2 is {e2}, which will incur him a cost of M = c2(S), if he deviated unilaterally.
The SPoA in this example is at least M/ε.
We can easily modify the above instance to make it a symmetric BCG: we
include strategy {e1} in Σ2 and define le1(S) = ∞ if 2 ∈ Ne1(S) (thus, e1 ∈ S2).
Similarly, we include strategy {e3} in Σ1 and define le3(S) = ∞ if 1 ∈ Ne3(S)
(thus, e3 ∈ S1). Note that the latency functions of the resulting symmetric BCG
satisfy Properties 1–3 above.
A final comment is in order. Structurally, the BCG defined in Example 1 ap-
pears to be identical to a Load Balancing game (such as the ones studied in [2])
with 2 players and 3 machines. The difference, however, is in the definition of the
latency functions. In Load Balancing games the latency of each machine (facility)
is additive in the players’ loads (weights), whereas in our example the latencies
are super-additive; this is especially visible in the definition of le2 above.
This example motivates our study of linear BCGs. We assume that the latency
function le of each facility e ∈ E is a linear function of the total weight assigned to
it, i.e., le(S) = aewe(S) for some ae ≥ 0. Linear BCGs constitute an important class
of BCGs because they generalize, for example, various Load Balancing games as
outlined in the Introduction. In particular, Load Balancing games with uniformly
related [11] or identical machines, also involving restricted assignments (see [15]),
constitute important special cases of linear BCGs.
A BCG is called a network BCG if there exists a directed graph G = (V,E)
such that every player i ∈ N is associated with a source si ∈ V and a sink ti ∈ V
and i’s strategy set Σi refers to the set of all directed paths from si to ti in G.
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Observe that the above example corresponds to a network BCG, with parallel
links connecting a single source node to a single sink (each facility corresponds to
a distinct link).
Unless stated otherwise, we assume subsequently that all player weights are at
least one, i.e., wi ≥ 1 for every i ∈ N ; this assumption is without loss of generality
as we can always enforce it, by scaling the weights appropriately. Moreover, when
studying identical facilities, we assume that the latency functions are identities,
i.e., le(S) = we(S) for every e ∈ E.
3 Facilities with Arbitrary Linear Latencies
In this section, we derive bounds on the PoA and SPoA of linear BCGs. We
consider both the general and the identical player case.
3.1 Arbitrarily Weighted Players
We first consider the most general case of arbitrary linear latency functions and
arbitrary player weights. We show that the PoA is at most 2m − 1 in this case.
We obtain a better bound of m on the SPoA and present an almost tight lower
bound.
Theorem 1 The Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Congestion games is at most
2m− 1 and at least m.
Proof Let S be a pure Nash equilibrium with cost C(S) = αγ∗ for some α ≥ 1. We
prove by induction that for every integer k, 1 ≤ k < α+12 + 1, there is a set Ek of
k distinct facilities such that for every e ∈ Ek, le(S) ≥ (α− k + 1)γ∗.
The claim holds true for k = 1 because there must exist a facility e ∈ E
with latency le(S) = αγ
∗. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds true for
k < α+12 . We will prove that there exists a set Ek+1 of k + 1 distinct facilities
such that le(S) ≥ (α − k)γ∗ for every e ∈ Ek+1. Choose from Ek a facility eˆ with
the smallest ae, i.e., eˆ = arg mine∈Ek ae. By the induction hypothesis, we have
leˆ(S) ≥ (α − k + 1)γ∗ > kγ∗. Let Ieˆ = Neˆ(S) be the set of players choosing eˆ
under S. Note that weˆ(S) = leˆ(S)/aeˆ > kγ
∗/aeˆ. Consider the strategies that the
players in Ieˆ choose under S
∗ and suppose for the sake of deriving a contradiction
that for every i ∈ Ieˆ, S∗i ∩ Ek 6= ∅. Then, by the pigeongole principle, there is
a facility e ∈ Ek with we(S∗) ≥ weˆ(S)/k > γ∗/aeˆ. By the choice of eˆ, we have
le(S
∗) = aewe(S∗) > γ∗, which is a contradiction to the definition of γ∗. Thus
there is a player j ∈ Ieˆ that chooses a strategy S∗j that is disjoint from Ek. Note
that for every e ∈ S∗j we have aewj ≤ γ∗. Since S is a pure Nash equilibrium,
player j cannot decrease his cost by deviating to S∗j and, thus, there is some
facility e′ ∈ S∗j \ Sj such that:
le′(S) = (ae′we′(S) + ae′wj)− ae′wj
≥ ci(S)− ae′wj ≥ leˆ(S)− γ∗ ≥ (α− k)γ∗
The inductive step follows by setting Ek+1 = Ek ∪ {e′}. By choosing k =
dα+12 e < α+12 + 1, we obtain that there is a set Ek ⊆ E with |Ek| ≥ k and thus
m ≥ |Ek| ≥ k ≥ α+12 . We conclude that PoA = α ≤ 2m− 1.
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The following instance shows that PoA ≥ m, even for symmetric BCGs with
identical facilities and identical players. Consider a BCG with player set N = [n]
and facility set E = [m] with m = n. Every player i ∈ N has unit weight wi = 1 and
the latency function le(S) of every e ∈ E is the identity function, i.e., le(S) = we(S).
Suppose that each player i ∈ N has strategy set Σi = 2E . If every player chooses
a distinct facility we obtain an optimal strategy profile S∗ with γ∗ = 1. On the
other hand, consider the strategy profile S in which every player utilizes all the
facilities in E. This is a pure Nash equilibrium of cost C(S) = m. uunionsq
We derive a better upper bound on the SPoA for linear BCGs. The following key
lemma will be used several times in the paper.
Lemma 1 Let S be a strong equilibrium and let Iλ ⊆ I be a non-empty subset of
players such that for every i ∈ Iλ we have ci(S) ≥ λγ∗, for some λ ≥ 1.
1. Then, there is a player i ∈ Iλ and a facility e ∈ S∗i such that le(S−Iλ) ≥ (λ−1)γ∗.
2. Suppose that Iλ is maximal. Then, there is a subset of players Tλ ⊆ N \ Iλ with
w(Tλ) ≥ λ− 1 and for every i ∈ Tλ we have (λ− 1)γ∗ ≤ ci(S) < λγ∗.
Proof We first prove the first part of the lemma. Note that for every player i ∈ Iλ
and every e ∈ S∗i we have
le(S
∗
Iλ) ≤ le(S∗) ≤ γ∗. (1)
Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that for every player i ∈ Iλ and for
every e ∈ S∗i it holds that le(S−Iλ) < (λ − 1)γ∗. Consider the strategy profile
S′ = (S−Iλ , S
∗
Iλ
) in which the players in Iλ deviate to their optimal strategies in
S∗. Using (1), we obtain for every i ∈ Iλ and for every e ∈ S∗i :
le(S
′) = le(S∗Iλ) + le(S−Iλ) < γ
∗ + (λ− 1)γ∗ = λγ∗. (2)
Thus, for every i ∈ Iλ, ci(S′) = maxe∈S∗i le(S′) < λγ∗, which is a contradiction
to S being a strong equilibrium.
We next prove the second part of the lemma. Let i ∈ Iλ be a player and e ∈ S∗i
be a facility satisfying le(S−Iλ) ≥ (λ − 1)γ∗. Define Tλ as the set of players that
choose e under S but are not contained in Iλ, i.e., Tλ = Ne(S) \ Iλ ⊆ N \ Iλ. We
have
aew(Tλ) = le(STλ) = le(S−Iλ) ≥ (λ− 1)γ∗. (3)
Since e ∈ S∗i and wi ≥ 1 for every i ∈ N , we have ae ≤ γ∗. Thus, w(Tλ) ≥ λ−1.
Consider an arbitrary player i ∈ Tλ. By the above we have, ci(S) ≥ le(S) ≥
le(STλ) ≥ (λ− 1)γ∗. Moreover, by the maximality of Iλ and since i 6∈ Iλ, we have
ci(S) < λγ
∗. uunionsq
Remark 1 Observe that in the above proof we exploit the linearity of the latency
functions only in (2). In fact, we can draw exactly the same conclusion if all latency
functions are sub-additive, i.e., for every e ∈ E, le(x + y) ≤ le(x) + le(y) for every
x, y ∈ R+. As a consequence, all our upper bounds on the SPoA that exploit the
first part of Lemma 1 hold for sub-additive latency functions.
Theorem 2 The strong Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Congestion games is at
most m.
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Proof Let S be a strong equilibrium with cost C(S) = αγ∗ for some α > 1. For
an arbitrary real value 1 < λ ≤ α, let Iλ be the maximal non-empty set of players
Iλ = {i ∈ N | ci(S) ≥ λγ∗}. Applying Lemma 1, we obtain a player set Tλ such
that for every i ∈ Tλ we have (λ−1)γ∗ ≤ ci(S) < λγ∗. Moreover, w(Tλ) ≥ λ−1 > 0
because λ > 1 and, thus, Tλ is non-empty. We can thus identify a family F =
{Tα, Tα−1, . . . , Tα−k} of k+1 player sets that are non-empty and pairwise disjoint,
where k is the largest integer satisfying α − k > 1. Every set Tλ ∈ F identifies at
least one distinct facility e ∈ E with (λ − 1)γ∗ ≤ le(S) < λγ∗. Moreover, there is
one facility e ∈ E with le(S) = αγ∗. We conclude that m ≥ |F | + 1 = k + 2 ≥ α
and, thus, SPoA = α ≤ m. uunionsq
Theorem 3 The strong Price of Anarchy is at least m−1 in general linear Bottleneck
Congestion games and at least m+13 in single-sink linear network Bottleneck Congestion
games.
Proof We describe a directed network BCG; the general case will follow directly.
Define 0! = 1 and let player i ∈ [n] have weight wi = 1/(i− 1)! and a source vertex
si. There is a single sink t for all players and n−1 auxiliary vertices vi, i = 2, . . . , n.
The set of arcs is E = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ { (s1, t), (sn, t) }, where:
E1 =
{
(si, vi+1)
∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n− 1} ∪ { (si, vi) ∣∣ i = 2, . . . , n}
E2 =
{
(vi, t)
∣∣ i = 2, . . . , n}
Then, m = |E| = |E1|+ |E2|+ 2 = 2(n− 1) + (n− 1) + 2 = 3n− 1. For each arc
e ∈ E1 set ae = 1. For i = 2, . . . , n− 1 let a(vi,t) = (i− 1)!. Also, set a(s1,t) = 1 and
a(sn,t) = n!. An example for the case n = 4 appears in Figure 1. Each player has
two strategies, an upper path { (si, vi+1), (vi+1, t) }, i = 1, . . . , n − 1, and a lower
path { (si, vi), (vi, t) }, i = 2, . . . , n. The upper path of player n is {(sn, t)} and the
lower path of player 1 is { (s1, t) }.
Under configuration S, wherein all players play their upper paths we have
ci(S) = i!/(i − 1)! = i, thus C(S) = n = m+13 . We claim S is a strong equilib-
rium. Consider deviation of any coalition I ⊆ N and call S′ the resulting profile.
Let i be a player of minimum index in I and assume first i ≥ 2. Then, under S and
S′, i− 1 plays his upper path, { (si−1, vi), (vi, t) }. The only deviation available to
i is { (si, vi), (vi, t) }. Then:
ci(S
′) = max
{
l(si,vi)(S
′), l(vi,t)(S
′)
}
= max
{
1
(i− 1)! , (i− 1)! ·
(
1
(i− 1)! +
1
(i− 2)!
)}
= max
{
1
(i− 1)! , 1 + (i− 1)
}
= i = ci(S)
Player 1 will not participate in any coalition, because a cost of 1 is incurred to
him under S and when playing his lower path. Then S is a strong equilibrium.
In the socially optimum configuration every player plays his lower path alone and
has cost ci(S
∗) = (i − 1)!/(i − 1)! = 1. Thus SPoA ≥ m+13 . For the general case
we simply regard links in { (s1, t) } ∪ E2 ∪ { (sn, t) } as m = n + 1 facilities ej ,
j ∈ [n+1] and restrict every player’s i strategy space to { ei, ei+1 }. If every player
plays ei+1 we obtain a strong equilibrium similar to S described above. The social
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Fig. 1 An example of a single-sink linear network BCG used to prove the lower bound of
Theorem 3. There are n = 4 players and m = 11 links. Player i has weight wi and source
node si. Each link is labeled with its latency factor. If every player plays the “lower” path
available to him, the maximum latency on any facility is 1. If every player plays the “upper”
path available to him, the maximum latency on any facility is 4 = (m+ 1)/3.
optimum occurs when player i plays ei. We omit a detailed analysis because a
similar construction appeared in [15]. uunionsq
3.2 Identically Weighted Players
We next derive an upper bound on the SPoA for linear BCGs if the weights of
all players are identical. In this subsection, we assume, without loss of generality,
that the weight of each player i ∈ N is wi = 1.
Theorem 4 The strong Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Congestion games with
identically weighted players is, in general, at most 12 +
√
2n− 32 ; it is exactly 2 for
symmetric such games.
Proof We prove the first part of the theorem. Let S be a strong equilibrium with
cost C(S) = αγ∗ for some α > 1. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we can apply
Lemma 1 to identify a family F = {Tα, Tα−1, . . . , Tα−k} of k+1 player sets that are
non-empty and pairwise disjoint, where k is the largest integer satisfying α−k > 1.
Each such set Tλ ∈ F contains at least λ− 1 players, i.e., |Tλ| ≥ dλ− 1e for every
α−k ≤ λ ≤ α. Moreover, there is at least one player that experiences a congestion
of αγ∗. Thus:
n ≥ 1 +
dα−1e∑
λ=1
λ ≥ 1 + α(α− 1)
2
.
Solving for α, we obtain α ≤ 1/2 +
√
2n− 3/2.
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Fig. 2 A symmetric network linear BCG instance with identical links as used in the proof of
Theorem 4. The strong Price of Anarchy is at least 2 on this instance.
We next prove the second part of the theorem. In a strong equilibrium S,
at least one player i ∈ N must have cost ci(S) ≤ γ∗ since otherwise the grand
coalition could deviate to the socially optimal strategy profile. Suppose there is a
player j ∈ N whose cost is more than two times larger than the cost of i. Consider
the deviation S′ = (S−j , Si) where player j deviates to the strategy of player i.
Then cj(S
′) ≤ maxe∈Si ae(we(S) + 1) ≤ maxe∈Si 2aewe(S) ≤ 2ci(S), which is a
contradiction to S being a strong equilibrium.
The following example establishes the tightness of this bound. Let N = [3] and
E = [6]. Every player i ∈ N has weight wi = 1 and every facility e ∈ E incurs
latency ae = 1 per unit of load. The strategy set of every player is:{
σ1 = {e1}, σ2 = {e2, e3}, σ3 = {e4, e5}, σ4 = {e2, e5, e6}
}
.
The social optimum is S∗i = σi for every player i ∈ [3] with γ∗ = 1. A strong
equilibirum is given by S1 = σ4 and S2 = S3 = σ1. The cost of S is C(S) = 2.
It is easy to see that this example is a (symmetric) network BCG, as depicted in
Figure 2; define the directed arcs e1 = (s, t), e2 = (s, u), e3 = (u, t), e4 = (s, v),
e5 = (v, t), and e6 = (u, v). Then each strategy corresponds to an (directed) s – t
path. uunionsq
4 Facilities with Identical Linear Latencies
In this section, we study the SPoA for the case of linear BCGs with identical
facilities, i.e., the latency function of every facility e ∈ E is le(S) = we(S).
Theorem 5 The strong Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Congestion games with
identical facilities is at most −12 +
√
2m+ 14 , in general, and exactly 2 in the case of
symmetric games.
Proof For the symmetric case we claim that in any strong equilibrium configuration
S, there is at least one player i0 with ci0(S) ≤ γ∗. Indeed, if ci(S) > γ∗ for all
players i, then the grand coalition would deviate to S∗. Now for any player i we
have γ∗ ≥ wi. Let i be any player with e ∈ Si such that ci(S) = le(S) = C(S).
Consider unilateral deviation S′i = Si0 of i. Then, because S is also a pure Nash
equilibrium, C(S) = ci(S) ≤ ci0(S) + wi ≤ 2γ∗. A tight lower bound has already
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been presented in Theorem 4 (with a directly corresponding network example in
Figure 2).
For the asymmetric case let the cost of a strong equilibrium S be C(S) = αγ∗,
for some α > 1. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, let Iλ be the maximal non-empty
set of players Iλ = {i ∈ N | ci(S) ≥ λγ∗} for some 1 < λ ≤ α. By Lemma 1, we
obtain a player set Tλ such that for every i ∈ Tλ we have (λ− 1)γ∗ ≤ ci(S) < λγ∗.
We can refine the argument given in the proof of Lemma 1 to bound the weight
of Tλ for identical facilities as follows: By inequality (3), we have w(Tλ) ≥ (λ −
1)γ∗/ae = (λ − 1)γ∗, where the last equality holds because for identical facilities
ae = 1 for every e ∈ E. Moreover, w(Tλ) ≥ (λ − 1)γ∗ > 0 because λ > 1 and thus
Tλ is non-empty. That is, we can identify a family F = {Tα, Tα−1, . . . , Tα−k} of
k + 1 player sets that are non-empty and pairwise disjoint, where k is the largest
integer satisfying α − k > 1. Moreover, by construction we have Iα ∩ Tλ = ∅ for
every Tλ ∈ F and w(Iα) ≥ αγ∗ since facilities are identical. The total weight w(N)
is then:
w(N) ≥ αγ∗ +
α∑
λ=α−k
w(Tλ) ≥ αγ∗ +
α∑
λ=α−k
(λ− 1)γ∗
≥ αγ∗ +
α−1∑
λ=0
λγ∗ = αγ∗ +
α−1∑
λ=1
λγ∗ =
α∑
λ=1
λγ∗
The latter equals 12αγ
∗(1 + α). Observe that γ∗ ≥ w(N)/m because facilities
are identical. We obtain 2m ≥ α(1 + α) or, equivalently, α ≤ −1/2 +
√
2m+ 1/4.
Since SPoA ≤ α the claim follows. uunionsq
Theorem 6 The strong Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Congestion games with
identical players and identical facilities is at least
⌊
− 12 +
√
2m+ 14
⌋
. For single-sink
linear network Bottleneck Congestion games, it is at least
⌊−14 + 12√2 + 2m⌋.
Proof We give a family of instances with m facilities and n = Θ(m) unweighted
players, which we turn into a family of network instances subsequently. Consider
a partition of the set of players N into q subsets, N =
⋃q
j=1 Pj , where |Pj | = j,
j ∈ [q]. Denote players in Pj by pji, i ∈ [j]. For each subset Pj make a new set of
j distinct facilities Ej = {ej1, . . . , ejj}. Define Eq+1 = E1. For every player pji ∈ Pj ,
i ∈ [j], set the strategy space of pji to:
Σpji =
{{e} ∣∣ e ∈ Ej} ∪ {Ej+1}
For the socially optimal configuration set S∗pji = {eji}. Then C(s∗) = 1. Now
consider the configuration S where Spji = Ej+1 for i ∈ [j], j ∈ [q]. The cost of S
is defined by the latency of the unique facility e = e11 ∈ E1 and is C(S) = le(S) =
|Pq| = q. For every player p ∈ Pj , we have cp(S) = j. We claim that S is a strong
equilibrium. Consider any deviation of any coalition I ⊆ N . Denote by S′p the novel
strategy that any player p ∈ I adopts and let S′ denote the resulting configuration.
Notice that for the unique player p ∈ P1 we have cp(S) = 1, hence no deviation
may lessen his cost and P1 ∩ I = ∅.
Let j = min{j′ | Pj′ ∩ I 6= ∅}; then j ≥ 2, and S′j ∩ Ej 6= ∅. For all j − 1
players pj−1,i ∈ Pj−1 it holds that Spj−1,i = Ej , because I ∩ Pj−1 = ∅. Hence,
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Fig. 3 An example for the SPoA on a single-sink network BCG with 35 identical links and
10 identical players. The strong equilibrium configuration consists of the dotted paths for all
players with the same source node and incurs a maximum latency of 4 on the uppermost link
in the figure. The social optimum has a cost of 1 and occurs if each player utilizes a distinct
(lowermost possible) path from his source node to t. Then, SPoA = 4 ≥ − 1
4
+ 1
2
√
2 + 2m
(Theorem 6).
cj(S
′) = j − 1 + 1 = j = cj(S). In any deviation of any coalition I, at least one
player does not have an incentive to deviate jointly with I and, hence, SPoA ≥ q.
Now q is the largest integer satisfying m = | ∪j Ej | ≥
∑q
j=1 j = q(q + 1)/2, which
yields q = b−1/2 +
√
2m+ 1/4c.
We convert the example into a network BCG . To grant access to players in Pj−1
to facilities in Ej , we make a path of length 3, {(sj , uji), (uji, vji), (vji, t)}, for every
facility eji ∈ Ej , i ≤ j−1 and a length-2 path {(sj , ujj), (ujj , t)} for ejj . Let Aj be the
set of arcs in these paths. Node sj is the source of all players in Pj and t is a common
sink for all players. Now we add auxiliary arcs A′j = {(vji, uj,i+1) | i ∈ [j − 1]}.
And, finally, an arc (sj−1, uj1), j ∈ {2, . . . , q}, by which players Pj−1 gain access to
Aj . For the last group of players we add an arc (sq, t). Let us illustrate the analog
of configuration S on the constructed network. All players in pji ∈ Pj , i ∈ [j], play
the same path strategy:
Sji =
{
(sj , uj+1,1)
}
∪
{
(uj+1,r, vj+1,r), (vj+1,r, uj+1,r+1)
∣∣∣ r ∈ [j]}
∪
{
(uj+1,j+1, t)
}
and Siq = (sq, t) for i ∈ [q]. See Figure 3 for an example with q = 4. The proof
that S is strong is analogous to the proof given for the non-network example. For
the optimal configuration we set S∗ji = {(sj , uji), (uji, vji), (vji, t)}, for each player
pij ∈ Pj , i < j, and Sjj = {(sj , ujj), (ujj , t)}. We identify q as the largest integer
satisfying for the total number of links m:
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m ≥
q∑
j=1
(|Aj |+ |A′j |) + q =
q∑
j=1
(3j − 1 + (j − 1)) + q − 1 = 2q2 + q − 1
which yields q =
⌊−14 + 12√2 + 2m⌋. uunionsq
4.1 k-Strong Equilibria
In this subsection, we derive more refined lower bounds for the k-SPoA for asym-
metric and symmetric BCGs with identical facilities. Particularly, in the symmetric
case, we exhibit a lower bound for the k-SPoA of symmetric network linear BCGs
which is of the same order as for general symmetric linear BCGs (Theorem 8
below).
Theorem 7 For any k ≥ 2, the k-strong Price of Anarchy of linear Bottleneck Con-
gestion games is at least max
{ ⌊
m
k−1
⌋− 1, ⌊− 12 +√2m+ 14⌋}.
Proof Take an instance with a set E of m identical facilities and a set N of n =
|N | = m identical players (of unit weights). For k ≤ b√m + 1c, we divide the
facilities and the players into p = k−1 groups 〈E0, N0〉, 〈E1, N1〉, . . . , 〈Ep−1, Np−1〉.
For each group 〈Er, Nr〉, we place b mk−1c facilities in Er and b mk−1c players in Nr.
The remaining at most k − 2 players and k − 2 facilities are distributed into the
existent groups (one player and facility per group). These players and facilities we
call residual. We shall not be concerned with residual players and facilities in our
construction; for a residual player i ∈ Nr, we will have the corresponding residual
facility, e ∈ Er, to be the player’s only available strategy. Moreover, the residual
facility e will not be part of any other player’s strategy. Thus, we may ignore
existence of residual players and facilities, as they will not affect the strategic
choices of other players, or be affected by them. Then, define q = b mk−1c and,
without loss of generality, we assume q = |Er| = |Nr|, for r = 0, . . . , p−1; we name
the facilities in Er by e
r
0, . . . , e
r
q−1. Let [·]q denote (·) mod q. For r = 0, . . . , p−1, we
define over Er two kinds of strategies, called s
r
j and σ
r
j , for every j ∈ {0, . . . , q−1}:
srj =
{
erj+1, . . . , e
r
[j+q−1]q
}
, σrj = { erj }
Now any specific subset Nr contains q players. Assume w.l.o.g. that they are
indexed by i ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}. For a socially optimal configuration, S∗, we set
S∗i = σ
[r+1]p
i for i = 0, . . . , q − 1. Then, each player uses exactly one facility under
S∗ and C(S∗) = 1.
Now consider the configuration S, where for each i ∈ Nr, Si = sri . We make this
strategy, along with σ
[r+1]p
i , to be the only two available strategies for i. Under
S, every player from Nr plays |Er| − 1 = q − 1 distinct facilities from Er and
each different player has a different facility of Er left out of his strategy, Si. Thus,
C(S) = q − 1 = b mk−1c − 1. An example of a 3-strong such configuration S with
m = 10 facilities and n = m = 10 players is described in Figure 4, along with the
previously described socially optimal configuration.
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Fig. 4 An example for the 3-SPoA of asymmetric linear BCGs with identical facilities (The-
orem 7), involving m = 10 facilities (depicted as boxes) and n = m = 10 identical players.
Each facility is labeled (inside the box) with the index of a single player using it in the socially
optimal configuration. Player indices on the top denote players using each facility at 3-strong
equilibrium.
We argue that S is a k-strong equilibrium. Consider any coalition, I ⊆ N , of
players that attempt to switch to their socially optimal strategies. We will show
that |I| ≥ k + 1. First, we show that I must contain at least one player from
every group. Indeed, let ir ∈ I ⊆ Nr for any r = 0, . . . , p − 1. Then, ir has an
optimum singleton strategy in E[r+1]p . Thus, at least two players from N[r+1]p
(using under S the single optimum facility, eri , of ir) must belong to I, so that
it is beneficial for ir to deviate to his (only alternative) optimum strategy. Then,
we deduce inductively that I must contain players from each of the p = k − 1
distinct groups. Secondly, we observe that, from each group, there must exist in I
at least 2 players from each group, so that a beneficial (socially optimal) strategy
is created for some other player of I (outside the group), to switch to. Otherwise,
some player will not be able to strictly improve his cost by deviating jointly within
I. Thus, we obtain |I| ≥ k + 1.
For an illustration of the argument, consider the example of Figure 4 which
depicts a 3-strong equilibrium. Only a joint deviation of 4 (or more) players is
possible: each player in I = {0, 1, 7, 8} can switch jointly to their optimal strategies
and improve their cost by 1.
Combination of the lower bound C(S)/C(S∗) obtained above, with the one
shown earlier in Theorem 6 for strong equilibria (that are also k-strong for any
value of k), yields the result. uunionsq
For the social inefficiency of k-strong equilibria in symmetric linear BCGs we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 8 The k-strong Price of Anarchy of symmetric linear Bottleneck Conges-
tion games is at least max{ 2, dm/(2k)e }. It is at least max{ 2, d(m+ 2)/(6k)e } for
symmetric network linear Bottleneck Congestion games.
Proof Take n identical players (of unit weight) and a set of m = 2n identical
facilities E∪F , where E = {ej | j = 0, . . . , n−1}, F = {fj | j = 0, . . . , n−1}. Without
loss of generality, we index the players by i = 0, . . . , n − 1. Let us first define the
strategy space of player i. A strategy of player i consists of any contiguous ordered
sequence of facilities ej , . . . , et, followed by any contiguous ordered sequence of
facilities ft, . . . , fl. We allow sequences of facilities in E or F , that “wrap around”
modulo n. In the socially optimal configuration player i plays {ei, fi} and the social
cost is 1.
Now we demonstrate a k-strong equilibrium configuration. Let q = dnk e−1. Set
the strategy of player i, to Si = {{ei, . . . , e[i+q]n}, {f[i+q]n , . . . , f[i+2q]n}}, where
for any i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we define [i + q]n = (i + q) mod n. This way each player
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uses 2(q + 1) facilities, q + 1 from set E and q + 1 from set F . Now we note that
every facility in E or F is the first for some player, the second for another and,
continuing in the same manner, the (q + 1)-th for some player (distinct from the
previous ones). Hence every facility is used by exactly q + 1 players, which yields
C(S) = dnk e = dm2k e.
We claim that S is a k-strong equilibrium. Consider deviation of any coalition
I ⊆ N , |I| ≤ k. We examine the number of valid beneficial strategies that emerge
under S−I , for members of I to adopt in the new configuration. First we notice that
removal of any pair of players i1, i2 from the configuration does not incur a strictly
more beneficial valid strategy for any of them. In particular, the most beneficial
strategy will include either {e[i1+q]n , f[i1+q]n} or {e[i2+q]n , f[i2+q]n}. However Si1
and Si2 may intersect in at most one facility from each of these sets. Hence there
is a facility with cost C(S) − 1 in both sets. Now we consider successive removal
of players ir, r = 3, . . . , k. Strategy Sir can intersect at best with the strategy of
one of i1, i2 at {e[ir+q]n} and with the strategy of the other at {f[ir+q]n}. Thus,
removal of i3 creates a beneficial strategy {e[ir+q]n , f[ir+q]n} of cost C(S)− 2, for
one player (out of i1, i2, i3). At most q such strategies may be created by removal
of q players whose strategies intersect “in their middle” with Si1 , Si2 appropriately.
In any case, we may not create more than k − 2 beneficial strategies, by removal
of k players. Thus S is k-strong.
By combining the derived lower bound C(S)/C(S∗) with the lower bound from
Theorem 4, we conclude the proof of the first statement of the result.
For the second statement, we present a network version of the example dis-
cussed above. A link is made for each facility ej , which is followed by a link for
facility fj . Arc ej leads by an additional link to arc e[j+1]n . Similarly for each arc
fj and f[j+1]n . Finally, we use n−1 additional arcs for making all players emanate
from a single source and n−1 arcs to guide them to a single sink. The source is the
tail vertex of some arc in E and the sink is the head vertex of some arc in F . In
total we use m = 6n−2 arcs, which yields a k-SPoA lower bound of dnk e = dm+26k e.
By combining this bound with the lower bound of Theorem 4 (which is a network
example, as depicted in Figure 2), we conclude the proof of the second statement.
For an illustration of this construction, Figure 5 presents a 2-strong equilibrium
for 6 identical players and 34 identical links. The maximum latency over all links
under this configuration is 3. The social optimum has cost 1 and emerges when all
players use link-disjoint paths to reach t from s. uunionsq
5 Summary and Open Problems
In this work, we derived inefficiency bounds for equilibria of linear Bottleneck
Congestion games. These games generalize Load Balancing games, which have
been investigated extensively in the literature [21,11,15]. In particular, we proved
upper and lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy of pure Nash equilibria and strong
equilibria of linear BCGs. We considered several special cases of these games,
including identical players, identical facilities and symmetric strategy spaces. For
most of our lower bounds we were able to provide asymptotically equivalent network
worst-case examples, wherein the players’ strategies constitute paths over directed
networks.
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Fig. 5 A lower bounding example for the 2-SPoA of symmetric network linear BCGs with
identical links (Theorem 8), involving 6 identical players. Player indices mark the links used by
each player at 2-strong equilibrium. In the socially optimal configuration each of the players
uses a distinct path from s to t, that is disjoint from the paths used by other players. 6 such
paths are visibly existent in the figure.
There are still several problems that remain to be resolved, towards completing
our understanding of the social inefficiency of equilibria in linear BCGs. In par-
ticular, we miss tight upper and lower bounds for symmetric linear BCGs (with
arbitrarily weighted players). Additionally, it would be interesting to derive tight
upper bounds for the k-strong Price of Anarchy for BCGs with identical facilities
to obtain a complete picture of the model’s performance in dependence on the
size of the coalitions that can deviate. Finally, it would be also very interesting to
derive tight bounds for networks BCGs.
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